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Unaffordable Justice: The High Cost of 
Mandatory Employment Arbitration for the 
Average Worker 
Lisa A. Nagele-Piazza* 
Although the use of arbitration provisions in collective 
bargaining agreements and executive employment contracts 
serve a beneficial purpose for workers and employers alike, the 
growing use of mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements in 
non-unionized employment settings stands as an obstacle for 
employees to vindicate their statutorily prescribed civil rights. In 
particular, by forcing workers to share in the unique costs of 
arbitration, employees may be deterred from bringing otherwise 
meritorious claims. Given the federal policy favoring 
arbitration, and in the absence of legislation banning mandatory 
employment arbitration agreements, it is essential for arbitration 
service providers and drafters of arbitration clauses to provide 
for employer paid arbitration expenses, all remedies that would 
be available to the employee in court, and the selection of a 
neutral arbitrator to ensure fairness for the average worker. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration has become a favorable method of resolving employment 
related conflicts without tying up the resources of the courts1 and is often 
viewed as fast, efficient, and less costly than litigation.2 It may also 
minimize hostilities between parties that seek to continue their 
relationship after the dispute is resolved because it is less formal and may 
be less adversarial than litigation.3 
Arbitration and mediation are alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) 
mechanisms. Mediation is a non-binding process wherein a neutral third-
party assists the disputing parties in reaching a “mutually agreeable 
solution.”4 Arbitration differs from mediation in that the neutral third-
party (or a panel of three neutrals) renders a decision that is binding on 
the disputing parties.5 While an arbitrator decides matters based on the 
evidence and arguments presented by each side of the disagreement, 
arbitration is typically less formal than judicial proceedings.6 
                                                                                                             
1 See Erin O’Hara O’Connor et. al., Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. 
REV. 133, 140 (2012). 
2 See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN 
EMPLOYMENT 8-9 (1997). 
3 Id. at 9-10. 
4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (8th ed. 2004). 
5 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 2004). 
6 See DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 1 (2d 
ed. 2007). 
2014] UNAFFORDABLE JUSTICE 41 
 
Arbitration has been the foremost method of dispute resolution 
involving labor related matters under collective bargaining agreements 
(“CBA”) since the 1960s Supreme Court decisions in the Steelworkers 
Trilogy.7 In these seminal cases, the Supreme Court created a 
presumption that employer-union disputes were arbitrable and 
determined that the role of courts in CBA disputes was limited.8 These 
decisions encouraged unions and employers to generate an internal 
system for resolving disputes based on the terms of their CBA.9 
Although arbitration became the predominant dispute resolution 
format for unionized workers, arbitration agreements in non-union 
settings were virtually nonexistent until relatively recently.10 
Historically, private, non-union employment was governed by the 
employment-at-will doctrine, which provides that both the employer and 
the employee have the right to terminate the employment relationship at 
any time and for any legal reason, without any liability.11 Therefore, 
there were few potential disputes that could arise from the average 
employment relationship, and employers had little need for arbitration 
agreements.12 While employment-at-will is still the presumption in the 
private workplace today, both federal and state statutes have been 
enacted that provide added protections for employees.13 These statutes 
include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990, as well as various state civil rights, fair employment, and workers’ 
compensation statutes.14 
As these laws evolved and private employees gained new rights in 
the workplace, employers sought to minimize their exposure to costly 
litigation by requiring employees to sign mandatory, pre-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate as a condition of employment.15 Employers may 
find arbitration preferable to litigation because they perceive juries in a 
trial to be unpredictable and more likely to decide the case based on 
                                                                                                             
7 See generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); see also 
BALES, supra note 2, at 6. 
8 See BALES, supra note 2, at 6. 
9 See id. at 20. 
10 See NOLAN, supra note 6, at 330-31. 
11 See id. at 330. 
12 See id. at 331. 
13 See id. 
14 See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Federal Laws Prohibiting Job 
Discrimination Questions and Answers, EEOC.GOV (Nov. 21, 2009), http://www.eeoc.gov
/facts/qanda.html; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12900 (West 2012). 
15 See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 2 (2d ed. 2006). 
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emotions or sympathy toward the employee, whereas neutral arbitrators 
are perceived as more likely to decide the case based on its merits.16 
Further, employers view arbitration as faster, less formal, and less costly 
than litigation.17 Additionally, employers may be able to avoid expensive 
class action lawsuits through arbitration agreements.18 
Mandatory arbitration agreements also receive judicial support.19 
Courts were already overburdened when they experienced an influx of 
employment rights claims.20 Thus, if arbitration was the standard for 
resolving these disputes, the courts could set standards in test cases while 
private dispute resolution proceedings could handle the majority of the 
cases.21 
On the contrary, many employee advocates view arbitration as 
disadvantageous to nonunionized workers.22 Employees are often forced 
to agree to arbitration or lose their jobs, and since agreements are usually 
non-negotiable and drafted by the employer, the agreements may be one-
sided or inherently designed to favor the employer.23 Further, if an 
agreement obligates the employee to split the cost of arbitration, the 
employee either may be unable to bring the claim or decide that the risk 
of personal expense is too high to justify bringing an otherwise 
meritorious claim.24 
This Article explores the unique dilemma faced by employees who 
are obligated to sign mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a 
condition of employment, and specifically focuses on how cost-splitting 
provisions serve as a barrier to the vindication of statutory rights. Federal 
and state court opinions on cost-splitting provisions vary greatly from 
intensive ad hoc analyses to per se rules disallowing their use. Although 
voluntary, post-dispute agreements to arbitrate are preferable to ensure 
                                                                                                             
16 See BALES, supra note 2, at 9. 
17 See id. 
18 See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751-52 (2011) 
(finding that (1) a “switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal 
advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, 
and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”; (2) “class 
arbitration requires procedural formality”; and (3) class arbitration greatly increases risks 
to defendants; therefore, an arbitration agreement that disallowed class actions could not 
be held unconscionable under state law) (emphasis in original)). 
19 See BALES, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. at 9. 
23 See id. 
24 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 687 (Cal. 
2000). 
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fairness,25 ultimately, if an employer is going to mandate arbitration, the 
agreement should: (1) allow employees to vindicate statutory rights, to 
the fullest extent prescribed by law, without incurring substantial fees 
and (2) minimize arbitrator bias (or perceived bias) toward the employer 
where the employer has paid for and determined the guidelines for the 
arbitration process. In the absence of a clearly-defined national standard 
that safeguards employees, courts and arbitration service providers must 
set criteria for arbitration agreements that ensure fairness for employees. 
A. Distinguishing Between Labor and Employment Arbitration 
To start, this Article must distinguish between the long-established 
use of arbitration in collective bargaining and the unique challenges that 
the individual employee in a non-union environment faces when he or 
she is required to arbitrate a claim.26 In the unionized labor setting, 
arbitration is commonly viewed as a swift and cost effective means of 
resolving disputes related to the CBA.27 In labor arbitration, the 
employee-grievant is provided with a union representative who likely has 
experience dealing with company management, arbitrators, and other 
grievants.28 Further, the employee’s share of the arbitration costs is paid 
from union dues.29 Therefore, arbitration is not cost-prohibitive to the 
grievant, and the likelihood of arbitrator bias is minimized by the union 
representative’s familiarity with individual arbitrators and the shared cost 
of arbitration between the union and the company.30 
In contrast, the non-unionized employee likely has little or no 
experience with the arbitration process, other than the matter at hand.31 
Moreover, as a “one-time player,” the employee has no knowledge of 
individual arbitrators and their potential biases.32 Unlike union-
represented workers, individual employees do not typically have funds 
allocated to pay for arbitration proceedings.33 Thus, when positioned 
against the employer, who may have previous dealings with specific 
arbitrators and has the finances to fund the arbitration process, the 
                                                                                                             
25 See Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration, NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 
(May 20, 2009), http://naarb.org/due_process.asp. 
26 See Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators’ Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory 
Arbitration for Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 13-14 
(2003). 
27 See id. at 14-15. 
28 See id. at 15. 
29 See id. at 32. 
30 See id. at 14-15. 
31 See Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, 
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 689-90 (2004). 
32 See id. at 690. 
33 See NOLAN, supra note 6, at 347. 
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employee is placed in a precarious position with the cards stacked 
against him.34 
As a result, it is essential for courts and ADR service providers to 
develop standards that enable employees to vindicate their statutory 
rights and receive damage awards that remedy the immediate injury and 
deter future violations of anti-discrimination laws. 
B. The White Collar vs. the Wage Worker’s Agreement  
It is also important to make the distinction between the contemporary 
use of mandatory employment arbitration and the traditional form of 
employment arbitration agreements, which were freely negotiated 
contracts between employers and sophisticated, sought-after 
professionals with bargaining power.35 High-level employees and 
executives often negotiate employment agreements that included salary 
and bonus compensation, benefits, incentive plans, and termination 
provisions.36 These agreements also address certain duties the executive 
may owe the company, such as a duty not to compete or disclose trade 
secrets and a duty to maintain confidentiality.37 Thus, there are various 
potential disputes that may prompt the employer to bring a claim against 
the executive employee. 
These duties arise out of the nature of the executive’s position and 
are often irrelevant to the average employee’s job responsibilities.38 The 
average employee is generally in a weaker bargaining position than the 
employer, and arbitration agreements are presented on a “take it or leave 
it” basis as a condition of initial or continued employment.39 Thus, this 
type of arbitration agreement is a unilateral contract of adhesion, 
meaning that employees must accept a set of standard terms, dictated by 
the employer, without the opportunity to negotiate.40 
Courts have found that an offer of new employment or the 
continuation of existing employment in an “at-will” environment is 
                                                                                                             
34 See Summers, supra note 31. 
35 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 
2000); see also O’Connor, supra note 1, at 136-38. 
36 See Randall Thomas, et al., Arbitration Clauses in CEO Employment Contracts: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 957, 960-61 (2010); see also 
Trigg v. Little Six Corp,, No. E2013-01929-COA-R9-CV, (Tenn. Ct. App. July 28, 2014) 
(arbitration clause was part of a chief engineer’s negotiated employment agreement that 
included a $1.5 million buyout of his equity in the company, a $154,472 annual salary 
and a $50,000 severance package). 
37 See Thomas, supra note 36, at 969; O’Connor, supra note 1, at 167-68. 
38 See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 694. 
39 See CARBONNEAU, supra note 15, at 2. 
40 BALES, supra note 2, at 122. 
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sufficient consideration for the mandatory agreement.41 If an employee 
does not wish to be bound to arbitration, he or she may find employment 
elsewhere.42 Critics of this reasoning bring to light the fact that in reality, 
this is not a viable option, as most workers cannot afford to forgo a job 
opportunity based on a requirement to arbitrate disputes.43 Moreover, if 
every employer in a particular industry imposes a similar arbitration 
obligation, than there are no meaningful options for workers who do not 
wish to be bound by such conditions.44 
While low-wage earning employees are the most disadvantaged by 
mandatory arbitration when there is a cost-splitting provision in the 
agreement, all but a few highly compensated professionals are likely to 
be discouraged from bringing a claim to arbitration when faced with 
potentially high fees, especially when they have recently been terminated 
from employment.45 Thus, the traditional use of freely-negotiated, 
executive-level arbitration agreements are markedly different than 
mandatory, non-negotiable, pre-dispute arbitration agreements that 
employees at all levels of the organization are required to sign as a 
condition of employment. This Article focuses on the latter. 
C. The Added Costs of Arbitration 
There are some costs that are similar in both arbitration and litigation 
proceedings. For example, an employee will pay a filing fee in both fora. 
Presently the cost for filing a claim in federal court is $350 plus a $50 
administrative fee,46 whereas organizations such as the American 
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) charge employees a $200 filing fee.47 
There are other costs in both litigation and arbitration that are not 
required but are typical expenses, such as attorneys’ fees; however, there 
are additional charges in arbitration that are not a part of the litigation 
process. 
                                                                                                             
41 See Tinder v. Pinkerton Security, 305 F. 3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Wisconsin 
recognizes that, because at-will employees are free to quit their jobs at any time, at-will 
employees give adequate consideration for employer promises that modify or supplant 
the at-will employment relationship by remaining on the job.”); In re Halliburton Co., 80 
S.W. 3d 566, 572-73 (Tex. 2002) (holding that a worker’s continued employment 
constituted acceptance of a binding arbitration agreement where he had clear notice of the 
changes to his at-will employment contract); see also NOLAN, supra note 6, at 363. 
42 See id. at 359. 
43 See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
44 See Alleyne, supra note 26, at 23-24. 
45 See NOLAN, supra note 6, at 347. 
46 See Forms and Fees, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/FormsAndFees/Fees.aspx 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2014). 
47 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES 32 (Nov. 1, 2009). 
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In arbitration, the employee may be required to pay fees in advance 
of the proceedings, as well as substantial costs at the conclusion of the 
process, which would be unheard of in a courtroom. For example, 
arbitrators charge the parties an hourly rate or per diem fee, whereas a 
judge’s salary would never be invoiced to the parties. In addition to the 
arbitrator’s fees, parties to an arbitration proceeding are required to pay 
for room rentals, stenography, administrative fees, and the arbitrator’s 
travel expenses. By the time the matter is resolved, arbitration costs and 
fees can amount to thousands of dollars, as one estimate shows the 
average cost of arbitrating an employment claim is approximately 
$20,000.00.48 In contrast, while litigation can be expensive, there are no 
required fees beyond the initial filing fee, and thus employee-claimants 
likely will not experience the same cost barriers in litigation as they may 
in arbitration. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs arbitration agreements 
that involve maritime trade and interstate commerce.49 While the FAA 
excludes “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or 
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,”50 
courts have construed this narrowly to exclude certain transportation 
workers and not contracts of employment generally.51 Thus, courts have 
upheld arbitration agreements that apply to employment relationships 
and have maintained a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements.”52 
Prior to the 1990s, it was generally accepted that arbitration 
agreements did not prevent employees from asserting common law or 
statutory claims.53 This was based on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., which held that that an arbitration 
provision in a CBA did not preclude an employee from bringing a claim 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.54 In relevant part, the 
Supreme Court explained: 
                                                                                                             
48 See Morse Barnes-Brown Pendleton, Should Employers Require the Workplace 
Disputes be Arbitrated?, http://www.mbbp.com/resources/employment/arbitration.html 
(last visited April 3, 2014). 
49 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
50 Id. 
51 See Tenney Eng’g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., (U.E.) 
Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 1953); see also BALES, supra note 2, at 44. 
52 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
53 NOLAN, supra note 6, at 331. 
54 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974). 
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In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee 
seeks to vindicate his contractual right under a 
collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a 
lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent 
statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly 
separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights 
is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a 
result of the same factual occurrence.55 
Accordingly, employment rights under the common law, as well as state 
and federal statutes, were considered separate from the CBA. 
In 1991, the seminal non-union employment arbitration case, Gilmer 
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., created a distinction between statutory 
claims that were outside of the CBA, as in Gardner-Denver, and 
arbitrations agreements that specifically included statutory claims arising 
out of the employment relationship.56 Gilmer, an employee of Interstate, 
was required as a condition of employment to register with the New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).57 In his application with the NYSE, 
Gilmer had to sign an agreement to arbitrate any employment-related 
disputes, including claims arising out of the termination of his 
employment.58 Interstate discharged Gilmer when he was sixty-two years 
old, and he subsequently filed a claim under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”) with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) and eventually filed a suit in federal district 
court.59 Based on the arbitration agreement Gilmer signed in his NYSE 
application, Interstate moved to dismiss the federal court claim and 
compel arbitration.60 
Gilmer argued, among other things, that arbitration was not an 
adequate forum to vindicate statutory employment rights.61 The Supreme 
Court struck down this argument based on the standard set in Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., which held that “[b]y 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than judicial, forum.”62 
                                                                                                             
55 Id. at 49-50. 
56 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
57 See id. at 23. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 23-24. 
60 See id. at 24. 
61 See id. at 26-27. 
62 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
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The Supreme Court distinguished Gilmer from Gardner-Denver in 
three ways: (1) the Gardner-Denver arbitration agreement, based on the 
CBA, did not include statutory claims; (2) since the Gardner-Denver 
case involved a CBA, where employees were represented by a union in 
the arbitration proceedings, “an important concern . . . was the tension 
between collective representation and individual statutory rights,” which 
was not applicable in Gilmer; and (3) Gardner-Denver was not decided 
under the FAA, “which reflects a ‘liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements.’”63 
Even though the Gilmer arbitration agreement was not considered a 
“contract of employment” because it was part of the NYSE application, 
court decisions following Gilmer involved an array of employment 
arbitration cases, including claims under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”), Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA), and Family Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”).64 Since the case law has been generally favorable 
toward mandatory arbitration in employment disputes, workplace 
relationships covered by mandatory arbitration agreements have grown 
to represent between twenty-five-percent and thirty-three-percent of non-
union workers.65 
Some employers have taken advantage of the policy favoring 
arbitration by creating agreements that put workers at a distinct 
disadvantage. One of the most extreme examples of an employer 
stacking the arbitration process in its favor can be found in Hooters of 
America, Inc. v. Phillips.66 In this case, Hooters required its staff to sign 
a mandatory arbitration agreement that required employees to follow 
certain rules, such as providing notice to the company with specific 
details regarding the nature of the claim and providing lists of witnesses 
                                                                                                             
63 Id. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 625 (1985)). 
64 See Durkin v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 481 (D. Kan. 1996) 
(compelling arbitration of a claims supervisor’s Title VII, ADA, ADEA and state law 
claims); Hampton v. ITT Corp., 829 F. Supp. 202 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (finding employment 
arbitration agreements enforceable for FLSA claims); Reese v. Commercial Credit Corp., 
955 F. Supp. 567 (D.S.C. 1997) (holding that an employee’s FMLA and ADA claims 
were within the scope of arbitration). 
65 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, An Arbitrator Looks at ADR in the Coming Decade, 
ABA Labor and Employment Law Section ADR in Labor and Employment Law 
Committee Midwinter Meeting, at 2 (2013) (citing Alexander J. S. Colvin, Labor & 
Employment ADR in a Portable Employment World: Moving Away from Employer 
Promulgated ADR?, ABA Section of Labor & Employment Law, ADR in Labor and 
Employment Law Committee Midwinter Meeting, Program Materials, Tab L (2012), 
available at, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2013/02
/adr_in_labor_employmentlawcommitteemidwintermeeting/s.authcheckdam.pdf). 
66 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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and summaries of each witness’ knowledge of the events.67 Hooters, on 
the other hand, was not required to provide any pleadings or notices.68 
Further, as if to eliminate all objectivity, employees had to choose 
arbitrators from a list of Hooters approved arbitrators.69 In the Hooters 
case, the Fourth Circuit found that Hooters’ rules were “so one-sided that 
their only purpose [was] to undermine the neutrality of the 
proceeding.”70 Thus, the entire agreement was held to be invalid.71 
In other cases, where employers placed limitations on statutory rights 
and remedies, courts have deemed arbitration clauses invalid. For 
example, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, employees were obligated 
to sign an arbitration agreement that limited the amount of damages an 
employee could be rewarded to an amount much less than prescribed by 
statute.72 The agreement stated that “back pay is limited to one year, 
front pay to two years, and punitive damages to the greater amount of 
front pay and back pay awarded or $5000.”73 On the other hand, the 
applicable statute had no such limits on back and front pay and included 
punitive damages.74 Applying California contract law to the arbitration 
agreement, the Ninth Circuit found these limitations on statutory rights to 
be unconscionable.75 
While courts have found clauses in arbitration agreements that are 
heavily one-sided or force employees to forfeit statutorily prescribed 
remedies to be invalid, courts are inconsistent in their rulings on other 
matters that serve as more subtle obstacles for employees to vindicate 
their rights. Among those obstacles are cost-splitting clauses, which 
force employees to share in the expense of arbitration and have the 
potential to create a significant barrier for employees to bring their 
claims.76 
III.  FEDERAL COURT RULINGS ON COST PROVISIONS 
Where federal statutes are the subject of a claim, courts have 
evaluated the effect of cost-splitting provisions on an employee’s ability 
to vindicate rights in accordance with the federal anti-discrimination 
                                                                                                             
67 See id. at 938. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 938-39. 
70 Id. at 938. 
71 See id. at 941. 
72 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002). 
73 See id. at 891. 
74 See id. at 894. 
75 See id. at 896. 
76 See Alleyne, supra note 26, at 4-5. 
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scheme. Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer, lower courts are 
not free to hold that mandatory employment arbitration agreements are 
categorically unenforceable.77 However, federal courts have not 
construed Gilmer to dictate that every employment arbitration agreement 
or all of its provisions must be held valid.78 Federal courts may deem an 
arbitration agreement unenforceable if the employee must “forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute,” instead of simply deferring 
“to resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”79 Motions to 
compel arbitration may be denied if the applicable federal statute 
intended to exclude arbitration as a forum or if the arbitration agreement 
requires the party to waive certain statutory rights.80 
In Gilmer, the employee was not required to pay any of the 
arbitration expenses, thus the Supreme Court did not address whether an 
employer may require employees to share in the arbitration cost.81 In a 
decision that followed Gilmer, Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. 
Randolph, the Supreme Court held, where the mandatory arbitration 
agreement was silent on the payment of arbitration fees, “[t]he ‘risk’ that 
[the claimant] will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to 
justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”82 While the Court in 
Green Tree did find the burden is on the party seeking to invalidate the 
agreement to show the likelihood of incurring prohibitive expenses, the 
Court did not determine how much of a showing is required.83 
Consequently, lower courts remain divided on the issue and have 
developed various tests that differ greatly between jurisdictions. 
A. The Case-by-Case Approach to Evaluating Cost-Sharing 
Agreements 
Since arbitration includes unique expenses that are not a part of court 
proceedings, some employers create arbitration agreements that split 
these fees between the parties. When determining whether a cost-sharing 
clause in an arbitration agreement is valid, courts have created various 
fact intensive tests that are applied on a case-by-case basis. For example, 
in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor, Inc., the Fourth Circuit 
developed an analysis that evaluated the cost-splitting clause on a 
                                                                                                             
77 See id. at 20. 
78 See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
79 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler–Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985); accord In re Poly-Am., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 349 (Tex. 2008). 
80 See Poly-Am., 262 S.W.3d at 349 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628. 
81 See Alleyne, supra note 26, at 20. 
82 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000). 
83 See id. at 92. 
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subjective basis, focused on the individual employee’s circumstances.84 
This test analyzes the following factors: (1) the employee’s ability to pay 
the fees and costs; (2) the estimated difference between the cost of 
arbitration and litigation; and (3) “whether that cost differential is so 
substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.”85 In other words, this test 
analyzes the cost of arbitration and the employee’s ability to pay for it 
against the cost of litigation and the employee’s ability to pay for it.86 
This test may determine that a manager earning $100,000.00 per year 
would not be deterred by the cost of arbitration whereas a factory worker 
earning minimum wage would be significantly dissuaded. This leaves a 
large gray area for courts to determine where to draw the line on what is 
“so substantial” as to become a barrier to the individual employee. 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s test requires a substantial amount 
of information at the start of the process that may not be readily available 
to the employee. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit determined that the 
Bradford test was deficient because “requiring the plaintiff to come 
forward with concrete estimates of anticipated or expected arbitration 
costs asks too much at this initial stage in the proceedings” since “such 
average figures may appear ‘too speculative’ to support a finding that the 
costs are prohibitively expensive, even though the plaintiff has no other 
evidence of the cost.”87 
As a means to overcome the speculative nature of the expense 
analysis in the Bradford approach, some courts have instituted a post hoc 
judicial review of the expenses, reasoning that the court will have before 
it the actual expenses and arbitration award.88 However, critics of this 
approach claim that “the post hoc judicial review approach places 
plaintiffs in a kind of ‘Catch 22’”89 because they cannot argue prior to 
the arbitration proceeding that it is prohibitively expensive, since they 
are unaware of what the actual costs will be, yet they cannot argue after 
arbitration that the costs deterred them from bringing the claim, because 
the arbitration has already occurred. 
The case-by-case approach presents additional problems. By only 
examining the effect of cost-spitting clauses on the individual, the 
Bradford test “is inadequate to protect the deterrent functions of the 
federal anti-discrimination statutes at issue.”90 Thus, to address these 
deficiencies, the Sixth Circuit, in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
                                                                                                             
84 Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001). 
85 Id. 
86 See id. at 559 n.5. 
87 Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 660 (6th Cir. 2003). 
88 See id. at 660-61. 
89 Id. at 662-63. 
90 Id. at 661. 
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developed a revised approach focused on the deterrent effect on classes 
of complainants.91 The Sixth Circuit determined that “a cost-splitting 
provision should be held unenforceable whenever it would have the 
‘chilling effect’ of deterring a substantial number of potential litigants 
from seeking to vindicate their statutory rights.”92 The Sixth Circuit’s 
revised test includes the following steps: 
1. Identify the class of employees who are 
similarly situated in terms of job description and socio-
economic status; 
2. Review the individual plaintiff’s income and 
other resources as representative of the members of the 
class and their ability to pay for arbitration; 
3. Consider the average cost of a typical arbitration 
and compare it to realistic litigation expenses; 
4. Review whether the employee will take on the 
added expenses of the arbitration forum (such as 
arbitrator fees and room rental); and 
5. Analyze the total costs and expenses of 
arbitration compared to the total cost of litigation and 
consider whether, when taken together, potential 
litigants would be deterred from arbitrating their 
claims.93 
The Sixth Circuit also provided that courts “should discount the 
possibilities that the plaintiff will not be required to pay costs or arbitral 
fees because of ultimate success on the merits, either because of cost-
shifting provisions . . . or because the arbitrator decides that such costs or 
fees are contrary to federal law.”94 The court reasoned that employees 
will likely “err on the side of caution”95 when deciding whether or not to 
pursue a claim, “especially when the worst-case scenario would mean 
not only losing on their substantive claims but also the imposition of the 
costs of the arbitration.”96 
Even though the Sixth Circuit’s revised case-by-case analysis in 
Morrison considered the deterrent purpose of federal anti-discrimination 
                                                                                                             
91 See id. at 663. 
92 Id. at 661 
93 See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663-65 (6th Cir. 2003). 
94 Id. at 664. 
95 Id. at 665 
96 Id 
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statutes in addition to the remedial role covered in the Bradford 
approach, critics still oppose any cost-sharing provisions for various 
reasons including: (1) arbitration should not cost the claimant any more 
than bringing the claim in court, (2) if the employer is unilaterally 
mandating arbitration, then it should have to pay the costs, and (3) 
litigants are not forced to compensate judges out of pocket, and 
therefore, they should not be responsible for paying the arbitrator’s fees 
and expenses.97 Thus, some courts have developed rules that deem cost-
sharing provisions per se denials of an employee’s access to a forum. 
B. Cost-Sharing as a per se Denial of an Employee’s Access 
to a Forum 
In Cole v. Burns International Security Services, the D.C. Circuit 
ruled that an employer could not require employees to pay all, or even 
part, of an arbitrator’s fees.98 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that “because 
public law confers both the substantive rights and a reasonable right of 
access to a neutral forum in which those rights can be vindicated . . . 
employees cannot be required to pay for the services of a ‘judge’ in 
order to pursue their statutory rights.”99 The court further ruled that the 
only way an employment arbitration agreement could be required as a 
condition of employment is if the employer is fully responsible for 
paying the arbitrator’s fees.100 If the employer wants the benefits of 
arbitration, then it should be prepared to pay for it, as the DC Circuit 
explained: 
Arbitration will occur in this case only because it has 
been mandated by the employer as a condition of 
employment. Absent this requirement, the employee 
would be free to pursue his claims in court without 
having to pay for the services of a judge. In such a 
circumstance—where arbitration has been imposed by 
the employer and occurs only at the option of the 
employer—arbitrators’ fees should be borne solely by 
the employer.101 
Thus, per se rules disallowing cost-sharing, such as this, are more 
employee-friendly than case-by-case approaches, not only because they 
place the financial burden solely on the employer who benefits from 
                                                                                                             
97 See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1465-69 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
98 See id. at 1485. 
99 Id. at 1468. 
100 See id. 
101 Id. at 1484-85. 
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arbitration, but also because employees do not have to spend additional 
time and money seeking a judicial determination on the validity of such 
cost-sharing provisions before the actual arbitration of the claim ever 
begins. 
IV.  STATE LAW DECISIONS ON COST PROVISIONS UNDER 
CONTRACT LAW 
Similar to the federal circuit court divide over cost-splitting 
provisions, the state courts vary significantly in their evaluation of 
arbitration fees as a barrier to vindicating statutory rights. Some states 
have per se rules, similar to the D.C. Circuit’s approach, and others 
employ case-by-case methods with differing standards of analysis that 
range from providing the employee with very little burden to requiring 
detailed calculations that demonstrate the employees’ inability to pay. 
This difference in state law analysis can be attributed, to some extent, to 
the states’ use of contract law to determine the validity of arbitration 
agreements. 
The Supreme Court has clearly stated in several opinions that the 
FAA pre-empts state law, and thus, governs arbitration agreements in 
both state and federal court.102 Therefore, state courts have limited power 
in this area since they are bound by the FAA and any state laws that 
disfavor arbitration will be pre-empted through the Supremacy Clause.103 
However, even though the FAA creates a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration,”104 section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”105 In other 
words, “[s]ection 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state 
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”106 Therefore, an 
arbitration agreement is only valid if it meets the requirements of the 
applicable state’s contract law, and the agreement must withstand general 
contract defenses, including fraud, duress, and unconscionability.107 
Nevertheless, states must treat arbitration favorably. As the Supreme 
Court provided in Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp.: “Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
                                                                                                             
102 See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); 
see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987). 
103 See In re Poly-Am. L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 349 (Tex. 2008). 
104 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. 
105 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
106 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. 
107 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996). 
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issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at 
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of 
waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”108 Furthermore, courts 
are not permitted to “invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws 
applicable only to arbitration provisions.”109 Thus, arbitration agreements 
must be evaluated like any other contract and not singled out for extra 
scrutiny or subjected to special rules.110 
A state court must determine “through the neutral application of its 
own contract law”111 whether there is an enforceable contract and 
whether there are any defenses that invalidate the contract while 
remaining in accord with the FAA’s provisions. It follows that 
challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements under state law often 
include a claim that the agreement is unenforceable on the grounds of 
unconscionability.112 
A. Unconscionability and Arbitration 
Although state laws vary, contracts are largely analyzed with regard 
to both procedural and substantive unconscionability.113 
Unconscionability, in general, refers to “extreme unfairness” in an 
agreement, as evaluated by the weaker party’s lack of meaningful choice 
and “contractual terms that unreasonably favor the other party.”114 
Procedural unconscionability refers to unfairness in the formation of the 
contract, while substantive unconscionability refers to the specific terms 
of the contract that may be unduly harsh or one-sided.115 Although some 
states, like California, require a finding of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability in order to render the contract 
unenforceable, a greater showing of one will mean a lesser showing of 
the other is required.116 
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1. California 
While most state courts agree that placing limits on statutorily 
prescribed remedies is unconscionable, states are divided on the use of 
cost-splitting provisions.117 Using the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Cole as 
guidance, the California Supreme Court, in Armendariz v. Foundation 
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., developed four requirements that 
arbitration agreements must meet in order to withstand an 
unconscionability claim: 
1. The agreement may not limit statutory remedies; 
2. The agreement must not deny the opportunity to 
engage in adequate discovery; 
3. A written arbitration decision must be issued to 
allow for judicial review; and 
4. The employee shall not be responsible for 
unreasonable costs and arbitration fees.118 
Where these minimum requirements were followed, in addition to 
arbitrator neutrality, the California Supreme Court held that arbitration is 
a permissible forum for employees to vindicate state statutory rights.119 
With regard to the cost of arbitration, the Armendariz court further 
elaborated that “when an employer imposes mandatory arbitration as a 
condition of employment, the arbitration agreement . . . cannot generally 
require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee 
would not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in 
court.”120 The court found this to be a fair rule, because “it places the 
cost of arbitration on the party that imposes it.”121 Furthermore, since this 
rule only applies to mandatory, pre-dispute agreements, the court 
reasoned that where arbitration genuinely is an efficient means of dispute 
resolution, the parties may negotiate a post-dispute agreement to 
arbitrate.122 
In her concurring opinion in Armendariz, Justice Brown disagreed 
with the “bright-line” approach requiring employers to pay for all of the 
costs peculiar to arbitration.123 Justice Brown found that the majority’s 
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approach “ignore[d] the unique circumstances of each case” including 
the employee’s ability to pay the expenses and the fact that some 
arbitration proceedings are less costly to employees than litigation.124 
Thus, Justice Brown’s concurring opinion concluded: 
As long as the mandatory arbitration agreement does not 
require the employee to front the arbitration forum costs 
or to pay a certain share of these costs, apportionment 
should be left to the arbitrator. When apportioning costs, 
the arbitrator should consider the magnitude of the costs 
unique to arbitration, the ability of the employee to pay a 
share of these costs, and the overall expense of the 
arbitration as compared to a court proceeding. 
Ultimately, any apportionment should ensure that the 
costs imposed on the employee, if known at the onset of 
litigation, would not have deterred her from enforcing 
her statutory rights or stopped her from effectively 
vindicating these rights.125 
This rule would eliminate any upfront costs that serve as an obstacle for 
employees to bring their claims, and it would delegate the responsibility 
of determining actual cost sharing to the arbitrator.126 However, it also 
asks the arbitrator to retrospectively determine what dollar amount would 
have deterred the employee from bringing a claim and to appropriate the 
costs accordingly.127 This cost allocation method may be confusing for 
some employees, and leaving it up to the arbitrator to allocate costs after 
the fact may still be viewed as too risky to employees who would face 
the imposition of potentially high fees.128 
2. Texas 
The Supreme Court of Texas follows a similar approach to Justice 
Brown’s, as it held in In re Poly-America, LP that determinations on the 
reasonableness of cost-splitting provisions were best left to the 
arbitrator.129 
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In Poly-America, an employee filed a claim for wrongful discharge 
and retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim under the Texas 
Workers’ Compensation Act, and in response, the employer filed a 
motion to compel arbitration.130 The employee claimed, inter alia, that 
the cost-splitting provision in the arbitration agreement was substantively 
unconscionable, and therefore, unenforceable under Texas law.131 The 
cost provision in Poly-America provided as follows: 
Fees associated with arbitration—including but not 
limited to mediation fees, the arbitrators’ fees, court 
reporter fees, and fees to secure a place for a hearing—
are to be split between the parties, with the employee’s 
share capped at ‘the gross compensation earned by the 
Employee in Employee’s highest earning month in the 
twelve months prior to the time the arbitrator issues his 
award.’132 
The agreement further provided that the arbitrator had the authority to 
modify unconscionable terms.133 The recently discharged employee 
expressed concern that this provision, which would potentially require 
him to pay his highest month’s gross income (around $3,300.00) in 
arbitration costs, was “way more money than [he] could afford.”134 He 
also stated that he unsuccessfully attempted to retain two attorneys on a 
contingency-fee basis, and both attorneys declined to represent him 
based on the arbitration agreement.135 The employer did not dispute these 
facts, but maintained that the provision was not unconscionable under 
Texas law.136 
The Texas Supreme Court declined to apply the per se 
unconscionability rule of the California courts, reasoning that employees 
should be required to provide “some evidence” that they “will likely 
incur arbitration costs in such an amount as to deter enforcement of 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”137 The court in Poly-America 
found the mere risk of unaffordable costs to be “too speculative to justify 
the invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”138 
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The court also found in Poly-America that, depending on the 
situation, the employee may not have to pay any expenses at all, or could 
even benefit from the capped cost provision as compared to the potential 
cost of litigation.139 Moreover, since the agreement in Poly-America 
allowed the arbitrator to modify unconscionable terms, the court 
reasoned that “if the cost provisions precluded [the employee’s] 
enforcement of his non-waivable statutory rights, they would surely be 
unconscionable . . . and the arbitrator would be free to modify them.”140 
The court held that the arbitrator was more suited to determine if the cost 
provision was prohibitive and upheld the lower court’s decision 
declining to find the provision unconscionable.141 
3. Other States 
Comparable to Texas, Washington requires employees to show that 
the cost-splitting provision is prohibitive.142 In Mendez v. Palm Harbor 
Homes, Inc., the Court of Appeals of Washington found a cost-splitting 
provision to be prohibitively expensive where the employee would have 
been required to pay a $2,000.00 filing fee in order to bring a $1,500.00 
claim.143 In Mendez, “[t]he filing cost of $2,000 [was] relatively certain 
under the AAA schedules produced by [the employee].”144 To the 
contrary, in Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc., where the 
employee could not offer any details about the actual fees she would 
incur in arbitration or her inability to pay them, the Supreme Court of 
Washington held the cost-splitting fee was not unconscionable (the issue, 
however, was also rendered moot because the employer offered to pay 
the arbitrator’s fees).145 
Further, in Zuver, even though the agreement provided that the 
prevailing party may be entitled to attorney’s fees, when the state law 
only allowed for the prevailing plaintiff to recover fees, the court did not 
find the provision to be unconscionable. The court reasoned that because 
the agreement used “the permissive word ‘may,’” it was “mere 
speculation to assume that the arbitrator would disregard case law 
holding that a prevailing defendant may receive attorney fees only if a 
plaintiff’s discrimination claim was ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation.’”146 In contrast, where the agreement used the directive word 
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“shall” in a similar provision in Walters v. A.A.A. Waterproofing, Inc., 
the Court of Appeals of Washington found the provision to be “one-sided 
and harsh” and “an enormous deterrent to an employee contemplating a 
suit.”147 
Missouri courts also require a specific showing of more than “just a 
hypothetical inability to pay.”148 In Moore v. Ferrellggas, Inc., the 
Western District of Michigan, applying Missouri contract law, found a 
cost-splitting provision enforceable where the plaintiff did not provide 
“the necessary evidence . . . to estimate the length of time necessary to 
complete arbitration or an estimate of arbitrators’ fees.”149 Nonetheless, 
the court in Moore decided to “indulge [the employee’s] argument and 
alternatively demonstrate why it fails.”150 Since the employee earned 
$50,000.00 annual income, which was approximately in the fiftieth 
percentile of income in the United States, the court was being asked “to 
conclude that arbitration provisions, such as the one [here], cannot be 
enforced against at least fifty percent of the population of the United 
States.”151 The court found this to be “quite telling as to the frivolousness 
of [the employee’s] argument,”152 although it made no mention of the 
fact that the employee in Moore had recently lost his job and his income. 
The Supreme Court of California cautions that “[t]urning a motion to 
compel arbitration into a mini-trial on the comparative costs and benefits 
of arbitration and litigation for a particular employee would not only be 
burdensome on the trial court and the parties, but would likely yield 
speculative answers.”153 The court also maintains that unless there are 
“clearly articulated guidelines,”154 post-arbitration apportionment of 
costs will create uncertainty to a degree that employees may consider it 
too risky to bring meritorious claims to arbitration. Furthermore, the 
employer is in the best position to perform a cost/benefit analysis when 
determining the most economical forum.155 Thus, rather than a case-by-
case analysis that burdens the courts and the parties, there should be a 
bright-line rule placing the unique cost of arbitration, specifically for 
mandatory, employer imposed, pre-dispute arbitration agreements, on the 
employer who imposed them.156 
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B. Severability 
Even where clauses are held unenforceable, judges have the 
discretion, in accordance with an agreement’s severability clause, to 
remove the invalid clause from the agreement and compel arbitration 
with the remaining, enforceable terms intact.157 For example, in Poly-
America, the Supreme Court of Texas held that where “provisions are not 
integral to the parties’ overall intended purpose to arbitrate their 
disputes”158 those terms “are severable from the remainder of the 
arbitration agreement.”159 However, “if the central purpose of the 
contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be 
enforced,” as the Supreme Court of California ruled in Armendariz.160 
Thus, since unconscionable terms may be severed without invalidating 
the entire arbitration agreement, employers have little incentive to refrain 
from crafting one-sided terms that disfavor employees. 
V. IS ARBITRATION A NEUTRAL FORUM WHEN THE EMPLOYER 
COVERS THE EXPENSES? 
The per se rule that requires employers to pay for arbitration may 
eliminate cost as an obstacle for employees, however, it creates a 
potential, or at least perceived, arbitrator bias toward the financing 
company. In Cole, the D.C. Circuit briefly addressed the concerns of 
commentators regarding arbitrator biases based on employer funding and 
dismissed them as unlikely.161 The Cole court felt that arbitrators were 
not concerned with the source of their paychecks, as long as each 
received one, and if an arbitrator was inclined to favor employers (which 
the court had no reason to believe was true) it was because the employer 
is a source of potential future business.162 The D.C. Circuit further 
supports its position that employer-funded arbitration does not promote 
arbitrator bias by stating: 
[T]here are several protections against the possibility of 
arbitrators systematically favoring employers because 
employers are the source of future business. For one 
thing, it is unlikely that such corruption would escape 
the scrutiny of plaintiffs’ lawyers or appointing agencies 
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like AAA. Corrupt arbitrators will not survive long in 
the business. In addition, wise employers and their 
representatives should see no benefit in currying the 
favor of corrupt arbitrators, because this will simply 
invite increased judicial review of arbitral judgments. 
Finally, if the arbitrators who are assigned to hear and 
decide statutory claims adhere to the professional and 
ethical standards set by arbitrators in the context of 
collective bargaining, there is little reason for concern. In 
this sense, the rich tradition of arbitration in collective 
bargaining does serve as a valuable model.163 
As a result, the D.C. Circuit held that the employee in Cole could not be 
compelled to arbitrate his claim as a condition of employment if he was 
required to pay any of the arbitrator’s fees or expenses and rejected the 
notion that employer-financed arbitration creates a bias process in favor 
of the employer.164 
Opponents of mandatory employment arbitration are not convinced 
by this reasoning. Judges in federal and state court alike are subject to 
disqualification if their ability to remain impartial may reasonably come 
into question.165 This is an objective standard that applies even if there is 
no actual impartiality but only the appearance of it.166 Courts regard this 
as a critical component in upholding the public’s confidence in the 
judicial system.167 Consequently, if arbitration is simply a change in 
forum, it should follow that arbitrators must also be disqualified if there 
is an appearance of bias.168 Some scholars believe it is likely that where 
an employer pays for all the expenses and is also a “repeat player” in the 
arbitration setting, it will hire arbitrators again in the future, and at a 
minimum, the process will appear to be bias in the favor of the 
employer.169 
VI.  MINIMIZING EMPLOYER BIAS THROUGH A NEUTRAL 
ARBITRATOR SELECTION PROCESS 
 It may be impossible to remove all perceptions of bias when the 
employer is paying for the process, but even critics of employment 
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arbitration agree that the mutual selection of an arbitrator minimizes this 
potential perception.170 
Biases may be further diminished by utilizing an arbitration service 
provider such as the AAA which is committed to neutrality in dispute 
resolution. The AAA has developed its own set of Employment 
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures that outline the AAA’s 
approved methods for selecting arbitrators, as well as the process for 
disqualifying partial arbitrators.171 The AAA will honor contractually 
agreed upon arbitrator selection procedures between the parties; 
however, the arbitrators must be neutral and experienced in employment 
law matters.172 Arbitrators must also act in good faith and “have no 
personal or financial interest in the results of the proceeding,”173 nor may 
they have a relationship with the parties or their representatives “that 
may create an appearance of bias.”174 If an arbitrator appears to be 
partial, parties have the right to object to the continued use of the 
arbitrator’s services, or the AAA may disqualify an arbitrator on its own 
accord.175 Thus, since the employee may object to the arbitrator after the 
proceedings have begun, when a bias may be revealed, this provides an 
additional safeguard for the employee. 
If the parties do not outline the arbitrator selection process in the 
agreement, the AAA shall send a list to both parties.176 The parties are 
encouraged to agree upon an arbitrator on the list, but if they cannot 
reach a decision, they are permitted to strike the names of arbitrators they 
object to and rank the remaining names in order of preference.177 The 
AAA will then select the name of a remaining arbitrator based on this 
elimination and ranking process.178 
By utilizing the services of an arbitration association, such as the 
AAA, employees are provided with added protections from arbitration 
agreements designed to create employer biases. Further, the association’s 
published rules and monitoring of procedures aid in institutionalizing 
fairness as part of the process. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNIFORMITY AND FAIRNESS 
Due to the lack of uniformity among courts in determining standards 
of fairness to adequately protect employees, there have been legislative 
attempts to eliminate the use of mandatory arbitration agreements in 
employment. Additionally, arbitration service providers have imposed 
minimum standards of fairness to safeguard employee rights. 
A. Proposed Legislation to Amend the Federal Arbitration Act 
The most effective way to protect employees and create a uniform 
standard would be to pass legislation that clarifies the intent of Congress 
in the FAA. Several attempts have been made in Congress to pass 
legislation banning mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements. An 
Arbitration Fairness Act was unsuccessfully introduced in the Senate in 
2007, 2009, and 2011.179 In May 2013, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2013, S. 878 sponsored by Senator Alan “Al” Franken (D-MN), was 
introduced to the Senate and HR. 1844, sponsored by Rep. Henry 
“Hank” Johnson, Jr. (D-GA), was introduced to the House of 
Representatives. In the bill, Congressional findings included: 
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act . . . .was intended to 
apply to disputes between commercial entities of 
generally similar sophistication and bargaining power. 
(2) A series of decisions by the Supreme Court of 
the United States have interpreted the Act so that it now 
extends to consumer disputes and employment disputes, 
contrary to the intent of Congress. 
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no 
meaningful choice whether to submit their claims to 
arbitration. Often, consumers and employees are not 
even aware that they have given up their rights. 
(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the 
development of public law because there is inadequate 
transparency and inadequate judicial review of 
arbitrators’ decisions. 
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(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative 
when consent to the arbitration is truly voluntary, and 
occurs after the dispute arises.180 
The Arbitration Fairness Act would “restore the original intent of the 
FAA by clarifying the scope of its application.”181 A new chapter would 
be added to the FAA invalidating mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements for employment, consumer, anti-trust, and civil rights 
matters.182 The proposed Act would not ban arbitration or place 
limitations on parties’ ability to enter into voluntary, post-dispute 
arbitration agreements, nor would it interfere with the rights of labor 
unions and companies to include arbitration provisions in CBAs.183 The 
purpose of the Act is to “restore[] the rights of workers and consumers to 
seek justice in our courts” and to safeguard the rights afforded by 
statute.184 
B. The Employment Due Process Protocol 
Emphasizing the need for fairness in employment arbitration, A Due 
Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes 
Arising out of the Employment Relationship (“Due Process Protocol”) 
was developed in 1995 by individual members of the Labor & 
Employment Section of the American Bar Association, the National 
Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”), 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services, and the National 
Lawyers Association.185 Although the committee of experts felt 
“impartiality is best assured by the parties sharing the fees and expenses 
of the mediator and arbitrator”186 this belief may be attributable to the 
members’ backgrounds in traditional labor arbitration where cost does 
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not present the same dilemma as it does in the non-union workforce.187 
Nonetheless, the Due Process Protocol set forth the following provisions 
as essential to fair arbitration proceedings: 
• Employee has the right to choose his or her own 
representative 
• Employee and the representative may determine 
their own fee arrangement and the arbitrator may 
provide fee reimbursement 
• Encouragement of “adequate but limited pre-
trial discovery” 
• Development of a roster of qualified mediators 
and arbitrators who have knowledge of the subject 
matter 
• Training on statutory issues, as well as the 
mediation and arbitration process 
• Duty of the arbitrator to disclose any 
relationships that present a conflict of interest – 
arbitrators should sign an oath stating that no conflict 
exists 
• Arbitrator should be bound the applicable 
agreements, statutes, regulations and rules of 
procedure188 
ADR service providers, such as the AAA, adopted the Due Process 
Protocol in their procedural rules and guidelines, although most 
providers have strengthened the employees’ protection against 
prohibitive expenses by requiring employers to pay all but the initial 
filing fee.189 
C. Organizational Minimum Standards of Fairness 
ADR service provider, JAMS, The Resolution Experts (formerly 
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.) has the following 
Policy on Employment Arbitration Minimum Standards of Procedural 
Fairness that must be included in mandatory arbitration agreements: 
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1. All remedies that would be available to the 
employee in court, including attorneys’ fees, exemplary 
damages, and statutes of limitations must also be 
available to the employee in arbitration. 
2. The arbitrator(s) must be neutral and the 
employee must have the opportunity to participate in the 
selection process. 
3. The employee must have the right to 
representation by counsel and the employer may not 
discourage the employee from obtaining counsel. 
4. The arbitration agreement must allow for the 
exchange of essential information. This discovery should 
minimally include: relevant documents, identification of 
witnesses and one deposition for each side. 
5. Each side has the right to present proof by way 
of testimony and documentary evidence, and each side 
also has the right to cross-examine witnesses. 
6. The cost and location must not be prohibitive for 
the employee. The employee may only be required to pay 
the initial case management fee. The employer must pay 
all other costs, including additional case management 
fees, and all of the arbitrator’s fees. 
7. There must be mutuality in the agreement, i.e., 
the requirements must be the same for the employer and 
the employee. 
8. The award must include a signed statement by 
the arbitrator regarding each claim and award, the 
reasons for any award, and the essential findings and 
conclusions that merited the award.190 
JAMS will only facilitate mandatory employment arbitrations if these 
minimum standards are met.191 Further, JAMS encourages the use of 
voluntary mediation or other forms of dispute resolution in the early 
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stages of conflict.192 It is important to note that the minimum standards 
listed above do not apply to individually negotiated agreements or to 
agreements that were entered into while the employee was represented or 
advised by counsel.193 Thus, these standards are meant specifically to 
ensure fairness in pre-dispute, mandatory employment arbitration 
agreements that were signed as a condition of employment.194 
Following these guidelines can help employers to create a fair and 
accessible dispute resolution process for employees and minimize 
potential litigation over the validity of the arbitration agreement. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
There has been much debate, both in scholarly journals and in the 
courtrooms, over what constitutes a fair and neutral arbitration process 
for employees to effectively vindicate their statutory rights. Opinions 
range from proponents who believe that arbitration is a quick and cost 
effective dispute resolution forum that is sufficiently bargained for in the 
employment process, to critics who feel that arbitration can never be an 
acceptable forum in employment because it takes advantage of workers 
in a weaker bargaining position. In the middle of the spectrum are 
employees and employers who would like to avoid the slow and highly 
adversarial litigation process in way that minimizes obstacles for 
employees. 
As demonstrated here, cost is a significant obstacle for employees 
and minimizes the other benefits of arbitration for those who cannot 
afford it. However, since legislative attempts to eliminate mandatory 
employment arbitration agreements have been unsuccessful, and the 
courts overwhelmingly favor arbitration, it is likely that employment 
disputes will be subjected to mandatory arbitration for the foreseeable 
future. Thus, to ensure that cost is not a barrier to employees seeking to 
vindicate statutory rights, it is essential for arbitration service providers 
and drafters of mandatory arbitration agreements to provide for employer 
paid arbitration expenses and a carefully designed arbitrator selection 
process that ensures neutrality. 
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